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Abstract 
This paper studies how local school competition affects teacher wages at markets where 
wages are set via individual wage bargaining. Using regional variation in private school 
entry generated by a Swedish reform which allowed private schools to enter freely and a 
comprehensive matched employer employee data covering all high school teachers in 
Sweden over 16 years, I analyze the effects of competition on wages as well as labor 
flows. The results suggest that competition translates into higher wages, also for 
teachers in public schools. While the average increases are modest new teachers gain 2 
percent and high ability teachers in math and science receive 4 percent higher wages in 
the most competitive areas compared to areas without any competition from private 
schools. Several robustness checks support a causal interpretation of the results which 
together highlight the potential gains from school competition through a more 
differentiated wage setting of teachers.  
Keywords: private school competition, teacher wages, monopsony power 
JEL-codes: J31, J42, J24 
                                                 
♣ I am grateful to Olof Åslund, David Figlio, Erik Grönqvist, Francis Kramarz, Mikael Lindahl, Matti Sarvimäki, 
Peter Nilsson, Oskar Nordström Skans and seminar participants at IFAU and VATT and the 2010 ELE Summer 
Institute in Reykjavik for helpful discussions and comments and to Björn Öckert, Mikael Lindahl and Anders 
Böhlmark for kindly sharing the data. 
∗ IFAU and Uppsala University, +46 18 471 60 54, lena.hensvik@ifau.uu.se. 
IFAU – Competition, wages and teacher sorting: 
  1 Table of contents 
1  .........................................................................................................3  Introduction
2  ....................................................6  School competition and wages: a background
3  .....................................................................................................................8  Data
3.1  ...................................................................................9  Measuring cognitive skills
3.2  ..............................................10  Defining the local labor market and competition
4  .....................................................................................10  Institutional framework
4.1  ...........................................................................................10  The voucher reform
4.2  ...............................................................................13  Setting the teachers’ wages
5  .............................................................................14  Competition and labor flows
6  .....................................................................................17  Competition and wages
6.1  .......................................................................................17  A first look at the data
6.2  ..............................................................................................18  Empirical strategy
6.3  .......................................................................................................20  Main results
6.3.1  ................................................................21  Differential effects by teachers’ field
6.4  .............................................................................................23  Robustness checks
6.5  ................................................25  Differential effects: gender and cognitive skills
7  .......................................................................................................29  Conclusions
References .......................................................................................................................31 
Appendix A: Descriptive patterns...................................................................................34 
Appendix B: Additional robustness checks.....................................................................38 
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 1 Introduction 
This study explores the impact of school competition on teacher flows and wages using 
local variation in private high school entry over more than ten years introduced by a 
Swedish voucher reform.
1 The reform allowed publicly funded private high schools to 
enter the market which gave rise to a sharp increase in private school openings (see 
Figure 1). Together with a rich matched employer employee data covering all teachers 
in Sweden, the within and cross-market differences in private competition are used to 
identify the effect on teacher wages.  
Studying the relevance of employer competition in the teachers’ market is important, 
both for understanding the determinants of wages in the teaching profession as well as 
the mechanisms of labor markets in general.
2 There is currently an ongoing debate 
about the desirability and consequences of introducing market oriented mechanisms in 
the teachers’ market in many countries. While proponents argue that removing the entry 
regulations and the rigid pay regimes would increase efficiency in the public school 
system, it has been very difficult to prove that private competition leads to higher 
student achievement.
3 Focusing the outcomes of teachers can provide insights to this 
debate, since a better allocation of teachers is one potential mechanism through which 
the competition effect may be realized. 
Public schools could in theory exploit their role as single buyers of teachers’ labor to 
keep wages below the competitive level (Boal and Ransom, 1997, Manning, 2003). 
Recent estimates of teachers’ labor supply elasticity support that schools have 
substantial monopsonistic power over teachers although from these studies it is not clear 
whether this actually translates into lower wages or how schools respond to increased 
competition in the teachers’ market (Falch, 2010, Ransom and Sims, 2010). Moreover, 
                                                 
1 A similar reform was implemented in 1992 at the compulsory school level. The reason for focusing on the high 
school level is first of all that the expansion of private schools is larger here and second because teachers’ field of 
specialization is well-defined. 
2 For instance several studies document large and systematic wage differences between observably identical workers, 
both across industries (Krueger and Summers, 1989, Katz and Summers, 1989 and Murphy and Topel, 1987, 1990) 
and local labor markets (Moretti, 2010). One theoretical explanation behind such differences is that they reflect 
variations in the competitiveness of markets, arising from e.g. search frictions or entry barriers (c.f. Manning, 2003). 
The economic relevance of imperfect competition is however far from fully understood in the empirical literature. 
3Several papers have estimated the relationship between private school penetration on test scores, grades and 
university attendance finding weak and inconsistent evidence of such student achievement gains both in Sweden and 
elsewhere (c.f. Ahlin, 2003, Böhlmark and Linddahl, 2009, Clark, 2009, Hoxby, 2003, Figlio and Hart, 2010).  
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  3 while deregulation experiences from the US have increased our understanding of the 
impact of competition in the private sector (Black and Strahan, 2003, Peoples, 1998) 
empirical evidence on the wage effects of introducing market economics in the public 
sector is still very scarce.  
The Swedish experience is particularly attractive since the early private school 
expansion introduced by the voucher reform allows for studying a long time period as 
well as high levels of competition compared to other countries. The Swedish private 
school penetration moreover took place in a context where wages are set via individual 
wage bargaining. By enabling schools to respond to local private competition, the 
Swedish experience thus provides a unique test of how wages are affected by private 






























Figure 1 Change in privatization 1991–2006 
 
The results deliver several findings about the teachers’ market. First, to provide a better 
understanding of how private school entry affects competing public schools the paper 
exploits the matched employer employee structure of the data to study teacher flows. 
The results suggest that private schools differ significantly from public schools in their 
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 recruitment behavior. Not only do they hire from a broader array of occupations than 
public schools but in line with Ballou and Podgursky (1997, 1998) and Hoxby (2002) I 
also find that private schools are more likely than public schools to attract teachers with 
subject area skills and high cognitive ability (rather than formal qualifications).  
I then go on to look at wages. By focusing on changes in local school competition 
within and across local labor markets my empirical strategy accounts for permanent 
regional differences that could otherwise generate a spurious relationship between 
competition and wages. The data at hand enables me to include both local labor market 
linear trends and teacher fixed effects in the estimations, to account for the possible 
trends in underlying determinants of wages as well as for compositional changes in the 
teaching pool.  
I find that the increased competition associated with private school penetration has 
led to higher teacher salaries. While the average effect is modest the wage gains are 
most pronounced among new teachers and teachers specialized in subject areas of 
needs; at current levels of privatization (at most 30 percent) teachers who are entering 
the most competitive areas and teachers specialized in math and science both receive 
about 2 percent higher wage than teachers in areas without competition from private 
schools. Importantly, the main effect persists once individual heterogeneity is controlled 
for suggesting that these effects are not explained by changes in teacher composition.  
A number of robustness checks support that the estimated effects capture the impact 
of competition rather than secular trends in the determinants of wages. More 
specifically I show that the estimates are not significantly different from the main effect 
when regional trends are excluded from the model, when county×year fixed effects are 
included or when the Stockholm metropolitan area is removed from the sample. Private 
school expansion is in addition unrelated to the wage growth for pre-school teachers and 
the estimates are robust to alternative definitions of the labor market. Together these 
results strengthen a causal interpretation of the main results. 
In the final part of the paper I examine the differential competition effect with 
respect to teachers’ cognitive skills, measured by test scores from the military 
enlistment. The effects are most pronounced among high ability teachers (males only) in 
math and science and there is also a clear association between the local labor market 
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  5 specific returns to ability and private school competition, which seems not to be driven 
by cross-market differences in general trends in the returns to ability. 
Overall, these results suggest that monopsonistic exploitation is a non-trivial 
determinant of wages in the teachers market. Because the strong labor unions are likely 
to mitigate the monopsony effects in Sweden, these may be even more pronounced in 
other settings. Importantly school competition has in addition led to a more market 
based wage setting where wages respond to teacher mobility, teacher needs and 
cognitive skills. If the transition to better student performance goes through the 
retention and employment of better teachers then these results highlight that school 
competition can have positive effects on educational output that are not necessarily 
realized in the short run.  
The rest of the paper outlines as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
framework and related literature; Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 the reform 
generating the variation exploited in the paper as well as the wage setting for teachers in 
Sweden. Section 5 provides a detailed description of the hiring patterns and a 
descriptive analysis of the link between competition and wages; Section 6 presents the 
results and Section 7 concludes.  
2  School competition and wages: a background 
In the static textbook model of monopsony power employers can exploit the low labor 
supply elasticity of workers by setting wages below the competitive level (see 
Ashenfelter et al, 2010 or Boal and Ransom, 1997 for reviews on the literature on 
monopsony). An increase in school competition should therefore lead to higher teacher 
wages through a reduction in schools market power, even if workers are identical.  
Recent estimates of the elasticity of teachers’ labor supply provide indirect evidence 
of monopsonistic power in the teachers market although these studies do not say 
whether schools actually exploit their market power to lower wages (Falch, 2010, 
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 Ransom and Sims, 2010).
4 Another strand of the literature based on cross-sectional 
evidence shows that areas with more private schools have higher public school teacher 
salaries (Vedder and Hall, 2000, Medcalfe and Thornton, 2006). Given the inherent 
difficulties of isolating the impact of competition from other sources of regional wage 
differentials such as compensating differentials, labor quality or efficiency wages it is 
not clear that these studies capture the true relationship between of school competition 
and wages.  
Market oriented reforms implemented in several countries improve the scope for 
credible identification of monopsony effects in the teachers’ labor market. The most 
closely related paper to my study is Jackson and Cowan (2009) who study the effects of 
charter school entry on public school teacher turnover and wages. Exploiting the entry 
of nearby charter schools in North Carolina, they provide compelling evidence that 
private competition leads to higher public school teacher salaries. However, a limitation 
with their setting is that teacher pay is largely determined by fixed teacher credentials 
which restricts schools’ ability to respond to local competition. In contrast, this paper 
examines the wage effects of competition in a context where wages are set via local 
negotiations between the school and the teacher. 
In addition I provide a more detailed analysis of how the competition effect operates. 
In theory, school competition could not only contribute to higher teacher wages overall, 
but also lead to a more differentiated wage setting. Workers who bear low costs of 
switching jobs should for example require a higher wage to stay with the current 
employer. In a dynamic framework, schools may moreover pay attention to the costs 
associated with teacher turnover and could hence be more eager to keep teachers in 
areas of needs since these must be replaced by on-the-job workers with higher 
reservation wages (Manning, 2003).  
Finally, on the demand side, schools that face competition should want to keep and 
attract teachers who help them to attract students. Relying on cross-sectional variation 
in local school competition, Hoxby (2002) provides results suggesting that schools put 
                                                 
4 Ransom and Sims (2010) find firm labor supply elasticities of 3.65 using data for school districts in Missouri and 
Falch (2010) studies the impact on the supply of teachers in Norway in response to an increase in wages in some 
schools with past recruitment difficulties finding an individual wage elasticity in the region 1.0-1.9. 
IFAU – Competition, wages and teacher sorting: 
  7 more value on teachers’ effort, independence, quality of college education and teachers’ 
math and science skills when faced with school choice, and that charter schools value 
such characteristics more than public schools. In this paper I examine the heterogeneous 
impact of private competition on teacher flows and wages to forward our understanding 
of how schools respond to incentives.  
3 Data   
The data used in this study come from population-wide registers collected by Statistics 
Sweden. The analysis is based on two main sources. The first of these, the teacher 
register (Lärarregistret), contains all teachers employed in Swedish schools as well as 
information about where they are employed (region, public/private), whether the 
individual is certified to be a teacher and field of specialization. The information can be 
linked to standard demographic characteristics as well as to aggregated regional 
statistics such as the number of high school students. From 1995 an onwards the data 
also hold information on the school in which the teacher is employed.  
The second register, Strukturlönestatistiken, has information on monthly full time 
wages for all individuals employed in the public sector and for a sample of individuals 
in the private sector. Wages are measured in November each year which means that 
teachers in the academic year 1991–1992 are assigned to the 1991 wage observation. 
The sampling is stratified by firm size and industry and the register holds weights that 
can be used to obtain aggregated regional statistics that are nationally representative. 
Since part of the empirical strategy relies on within teacher variation in competitive 
pressure from private schools, only teachers who appear in the sample two or more 
years will help to identify the coefficient of interest. The sampling implies that the 
probability of observing the same privately employed teacher more than once during the 
study period will be fairly low. For this reason, I impute their log monthly wage for all 
teachers in private schools who are not sampled in a given year. This is possible since 
the data contains annual income for all workers that can be used to recover information 
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 on wages for teachers in the private sector.
5 I will check the sensitivity of the results 
using the weights contained in the data. 
The main sample consists of all high school teachers in Sweden between the years 
1991 to 2006.
6 Individuals with appointments other than being a teacher, such as study 
counselors are excluded from the sample. In addition, for individuals with multiple 
observations i.e. for those who work in several schools in a year, I keep their main 
source of income. 
3.1 Measuring  cognitive  skills 
Part of the analysis uses measures of teachers’ cognitive skills obtained from the 
military enlistment. The test scores provide an evaluation of cognitive ability based on 
several subtests of logical, verbal and spatial abilities and are similar to the AFQT in the 
US.
7 The test scores have previously been related to future wages and earnings 
(Lindqvist and Vestman, 2008) and higher test scores among teachers have also been 
associated with higher student outcomes at the compulsory level (Grönqvist and 
Vlachos, 2009).
8 Estimating the wage returns to cognitive ability in my sample I 
received an approximately linear wage-test score relationship (not in paper). Taken 
together it is reasonable to assume that these cognitive skills provide some information 
about teacher quality that schools and parents value. All males in Sweden were obliged 
to go through the military draft and for cohorts born prior to 1980 almost all males in 
each cohort went through the draft procedure at age 18 or 19. This implies that 




                                                 
5 To impute the monthly wage for private teachers that are not sampled in a given year I use the predicted monthly 
wage obtained from estimation of a traditional mincerian wage regression, which apart from standard wage controls 
(sex, education and the age earning profile) includes a dummy for whether the teacher worked in a private school, 
detailed type of teaching position as well as a measure of the approximated wage on the right hand side derived by 
dividing the total annual earnings by the number of months adjusted for hours worked.  
6 1991 is the first year that the data contains wage information for all teachers in the public sector. 
7 For a more detailed description of these test scores, see Lindqvist and Vestman (2008). 
8 Görnqvist and Vlachos (2008) show that teachers with high cognitive skills benefit high performing students but not 
low performing students. I am not aware of any study that estimates the impact of teacher test scores on student high 
school achievement. 
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An important aspect when estimating the effects of employer competition is to define 
the market in which schools compete for labor. This paper uses Statistics Sweden’s 
definition of local labor market regions (LLMs). These are based on commuting 
distance and seem to capture the teacher’s true labor market quite well; 88 percent of all 
teachers in the sample work in the same local labor market as they reside.
9  As a 
sensitivity check I also consider alternative geographical boundaries when defining the 
local market.  
To define competition I use the share of private school teachers in a given local labor 
market and year. An alternative available measure would be to use the share of private 
high schools in the local area.
10 However since private schools are systematically 
smaller than public schools (see Figure 1) this definition would lead me to under 
estimate the impact of competition. For this reason I focus on the share of teachers as 
my preferred measure of competition throughout the analysis.  
4 Institutional  framework 
4.1  The voucher reform 
The expansion of private schools was induced by a voucher reform in 1994 that allowed 
municipality funded private schools to enter the market for high school education in 
Sweden. To qualify for opening, private schools must follow the national curriculum 
and the same rules for enrolment as public schools.
11 Importantly local governments 
who run the public schools cannot influence the approval which is made by the National 
Board of Education. 
Besides the overall expansion in private schools illustrated in Figure 1, the reform 
gave rise to large regional variation in private school penetration. Figure 2 displays how 
the private high school teachers were distributed across Sweden in 2006 and Figure A1 
                                                 
9 There are 109 local labor markets in Sweden, which consists of on average 2.6 municipalities and 4200 teachers. 
10 A third measure would be the share of private high school students but unfortunately this data is not available for 
the study period of interest in this paper. 
11 The schools are not allowed to charge tuition. I.e. top-up funding is not allowed over and above the voucher. 
Initially private schools were allowed to charge a tuition restricted to an amount considered ‘reasonable’ by the NAE 
but since 1997 the possibility to charge tuition is abolished. 
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 and Figure A2 in Appendix show the distribution in 1991 as well as the kernel density 
plot of the local labor market specific changes in privatization between 1991 and 2006. 
One can see from these figures that local labor markets had very different levels of 
private school penetration during the study period; whereas some areas experienced 
increases in the share of private school teachers with up to 30 percentage points, in 
some locations there had still in 2006 been no entry of private schools. The empirical 
strategy uses this within- and cross regional variation in private school penetration to 
identify the effect of school competition on teachers’ wages.  
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Figure 2 Variation in school privatization across Swedish local labor markets  
Notes: The figure is based on the share of private high school teachers in each of the local labor markets measured in 
2006. 
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 4.2  Setting the teachers’ wages 
In Sweden, teacher wages are determined at the local level, typically through 
negotiations between the teacher and the principal. The involvement of a local union 
representative is also possible to endorse the proposed salary.  
The individualized pay regime came in place in 1996 through an agreement between 
the employer’s organization and the teacher labor unions with the intention to give 
employers more discretion over wages to reward teacher quality and effort. Prior to the 
introduction of individualized wages, salaries were largely determined by fixed 
credentials based on type of work and years of experience, although local deviations 
were common, for instance to overcome teacher shortages.  
Interviews with single principals, support that local wage setting enables schools to 
reward teachers of high value and that teachers just entering the profession have 
benefitted most from the market based wages (Skolledningsnytt nr 06/2004). 
Quantitative evidence on the other hand suggests that the move to individualized pay 
had limited impact on the overall wage dispersion among high school teachers 
(Söderström, 2006).  
There are several potential explanations for these observations. Because there were 
deviations from the wage scales already before 1996 it is perhaps not surprising that the 
transition to the new regime had little effect overall. In fact, the labor union of the 
majority of high school teachers (Lärarnas Riksförbund) had already in 1992 accepted 
individualized wage setting (Söderström, 2006). It is furthermore possible that schools 
have low incentives to enforce individualized pay in a non-competitive environment. 
Hence enforcement of individualized wages is an important mechanism through which 
competition could affect teacher salaries in Swedish schools. Finally, because the wage 
scales had a steep age-earnings profile in the old regime, wage increases in the lower 
parts of the age distribution could actually lead to a more compressed wage structure 
than before. To fully understand the effects on wage dispersion it is important to 
consider the interactions between individualized wages, local school competition and 
worker experience. 
Finally, the high union coverage in Sweden may counteract the impact of school 
competition since the bargaining strength of workers reduces schools monopsony 
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  13 power. It is moreover possible that the changes in competition could in itself affect 
union power since the costs of organizing employees should be higher in industries with 
a larger number of employers (Peoples, 1998). Since both of these mechanisms would 
understate the effect of competition the effects found in the Swedish context are likely 
to be even larger in a setting without labor unions.  
5  Competition and labor flows  
I start out with an empirical analysis of the teacher flows. Understanding how private 
schools differ from public schools in recruitment behavior is important since the new 
private schools have stronger incentives to employ teachers who attract students 
(Hoxby, 2002). 
Table 1 provides a description of the hiring patterns in private and public schools 
respectively.
12 The data is a matched employer employee dataset where all teachers can 
be followed over time and across schools. New hires are defined as those not observed 
in the same school in the preceding three years and teachers recruited from other parts 
of the economy can also be identified.  
As seen from the table, private schools differ from public schools in their recruitment 
behavior, both in terms of teacher characteristics and recruitment methods. Private 
schools hire younger and fewer certified teachers than public schools, which is also 
reflected in that private schools hire more of their teachers from other levels, the private 
sector and from non-employment.
13 About 13 percent of the recruitments come from 
other public schools. 
                                                 
12 Worker flows are studied from 1995 since this is the first year that the data contains school identifiers. 
13 Among teachers hired from other levels, most hires come from primary schools and universities. Only a very low 
fraction (0.8 percent) is hired from pre-schools. Other sectors include e.g. adult education and labor market education. 
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Table 1 Who are the newly recruited? 
 Private    Public 
Age  38.8 43.6 
Certified   0.42 0.66 
Female  0.49 0.50 
Ability (males only)   0.43 0.40 
Fraction hired from:    
Public high schools  0.13 0.46 
Private high schools  0.13 0.01 
Other levels  0.34 0.29 
Other sector  0.23 0.14 
Non-employment  0.17 0.11 
Fractions from other sectors:    
Manufacturing  10.1 9.9 
Construction  2.3 4.7 
Wholesale and retail trade  12. 7  11.3 
Hotels and restaurants  5.0 5.8 
Transport, storage and communication  5.4 5.4 
Financial intermediation  1.4 0.9 
Real Estate, renting and business activity  23.3 14.5 
Public administration and defense  6.4 9.2 
Health and social services  14.8 19.7 
Other community, social and personal services  17.5 17.4 
Observations  66,212 9,609 
Notes: The sample consists of all newly hired teachers during the period 1991-2006. 
  
Next, I look at the characteristics of those who leave the public for private high schools. 
An advantage of the data used for this study is that it contains all teachers employed in 
each school. This means that I can explore whether teachers with certain characteristics 
are more likely to leave a public school for a private in comparison to her colleagues. In 
practice, the model includes a fixed effect at the previous school×year level which 
implies that it estimates the probability of a teacher being hired in a private/public 
school among all teachers in the same school and year. An advantage of this 
specification is that it accounts for all school characteristics that could influence the 
hiring decision in a given year, such as worker composition and regional location of the 
school.
14 To contrast the results I also look at the probabilities to leave a public school 
for another public school. 
                                                 
14 I restrict the sample to fixed effects groups where there is variation in the dependent variable, i.e. to schools from 
where someone was actually hired. A similar method is applied in e.g. Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008) and Kramarz and 
Skans (2007). 
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  15 The results are reported in Table 2. As expected, younger teachers are always more 
likely to leave public schools, irrespectively if the recruiting school is public or private. 
Compared to public schools (column (4)-(6)) private schools are more likely to hire 
teachers without formal certification and teachers specialized in certain fields, such as 
social science and math and science (although in the latter case the difference is not 
statistically significant). Interestingly, they also seem to hire teachers with higher ability 
rank (Column 2) even within subjects (Column (3)).
15 Overall, the results are consistent 
with Ballau and Podgursky (1998) or Hoxby (2002) who find that private schools hire 
teachers who lack formal skills but who are of higher ability than those demanded by 
public schools. 
Table 2 Flows from public to private and public to public  
  Recruiting school is: 
 Private    Public 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All  Males
A 
Within 







































        








































Mean of dep. variable  1.93 2.72 2.72  15.25  14.46  14.46 
Observations  65,453 15,031 15,031  196,122 43,378 43,378 
R  0.096 0.141 0.312 0.592 0.574 0.658 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent 
level respectively. Standard errors robust for serial correlation at the school level are shown in parentheses. The  
sample includes all actual hires as well as all teachers at the previous public school and the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable taking the value one if the teacher was the one being recruited to the new school. Columns (3) and 
(6) display the results when estimating the differential hiring probabilities for teachers within the same school, year 
and field. The dependent variable has been scaled by 100 hence the mean probability to be recruited is approximately 
2 percent. A) Because this model estimates the impact of cognitive ability the sample is restricted to the cohorts for 
                                                 
15 This suggests that the effect is driven by different hiring probabilities across subjects. 
16  IFAU – Competition, wages and teacher sorting: 
 whom data is available, i.e. males born between 1951 and 1981. B) The omitted category contains all other teachers, 
i.e. non-certified teachers as well as teachers specialized in other fields. 
6  Competition and wages 
6.1  A first look at the data 
Table A1 in Appendix presents descriptive statistics for the teachers included in the 
estimations in the pre- and post reform period respectively. As seen in the table the 
share of private teachers was close to zero before the reform and increased to on 
average 7 percent in the post reform years. In addition, the teacher labor pool has shifted 
towards fewer certified teachers. Columns (2) and (3) compare teachers in more or less 
competitive markets. There are substantially fewer teachers in regions without any 
future expansion of private schools due to the higher frequency of private schools in 
urban areas. While the teachers receive similar wages in the pre-reform period 
irrespectively of future expansion, wages are higher among teachers in competitive 
markets in the post-reform period.  
Figure 3 displays the evolution of the median wage difference between regions with 
and without future private school expansion during the study period. There is no clear 
trend prior to 1994 whereas after the reform wages start to diverge in favor of teachers 
in more competitive labor markets. Unless this pattern is explained by unobserved time-
varying differences between more or less competitive markets the figure clearly 
suggests that private competition has a positive effect on teacher wages.  
 
IFAU – Competition, wages and teacher sorting: 






































1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Year
 
Figure 3 Median wage difference between teachers in competitive and non-competitive 
regions 1991–2006 
Notes: The figure displays the median wage ratio between local labor markets with and without any post-reform 
private school expansion.  
6.2 Empirical  strategy 
To estimate the impact of school competition on teacher wages I exploit the variation in 
private school expansion following the voucher reform using individual data. The 
empirical specification is given by: 
 
13 log ( Post)  + ilt lt l t l ilt ilt wP Y e a r X β μμμ β ε =× + + ×+ +  (1) 
 
where w is the wage for teacher i in local labor market l in time period t;  P  is the 
continuous measure of the degree of competition in local labor market, Post is a dummy 
taking the value one after the private school reform (=1 if after 1994)
16,  ijt X  is a vector 
of observable teacher characteristics (gender, age, educational attainment and 
certification status) as well as the number of pupils in high school age,  t μ and  l μ  are 
                                                 
16 Since all variation comes from the post reform period. Exploiting the variation in the entire period (1991–2006) 
yields similar result. 
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 year and local labor market dummies,  l Year μ ×  are local labor market specific time 
trends and  ilt ε  is the error term. The parameter of interest is  1 β which captures the full 
reform impact of competition in the local labor market averaged across all teachers, 
both public and private. Importantly, this means that sorting of teachers or students 
between public and private schools within local labor markets will not bias the 
estimates.   
The baseline specification takes into account many of the confounding factors that 
could generate a spurious relationship between competition and wages; the covariates in 
X account for compositional changes in the observed characteristics of the teaching pool 
as well as for changes in the local demand for schooling due to changes in cohort size; 
the year dummies control for smoothly evolving factors such as business cycle effects 
and long term national trends and the local labor market dummies account for time-
invariant differences between different regions. Importantly the long time period also 
allows me to eliminate local linear labor market specific trends, which implies that the 
parameter of interest is identified from the residual variation in each labor market 
around its own linear time trend.  
A potential concern is that teachers may sort into labor markets with more or less 
competition based on unobserved characteristics. If this is the case  1 β may capture both 
direct effects of competition for incumbent teachers as well as compositional changes in 
the teacher pool. To account for such compositional changes I augment model (1) with a 
vector of teacher specific indicators, i μ . This model is given by: 
 
13 log ilt ( Post)  + i lt l ilt wP Y e a r X t l ilt μ βμ μ β ε =+ × × + + μ ++    (2) 
 
The model relies on variation in teachers’ exposure to school competition and hence it 
accounts for all unobserved teacher characteristics that are fixed over time. 
Consequently, it identifies the impact of competition for incumbent teachers only. An 
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  19 advantage with this specification is that it allows me to separate the wage effects for 
public and private teachers.
17 
The assumption maintained for identification is always that the regional private 
school expansion is uncorrelated with the error term once I have conditioned on all 
covariates included in (1) and (2). This means that  1 β will be biased if regions with 
private school openings even in its absence would have experienced increasing wages. 
To validate the empirical findings I will check the sensitivity of these results further 
below. 
6.3 Main  results 
The estimate in the first column in Table 3 shows the baseline effect from estimation of 
equation (1), which relates teacher wages to the private school share in the assigned 
local labor market. The dependent variable is the individual log monthly wage and all 
specifications include individual wage controls, the number of individuals in high 
school age, year dummies, local labor market fixed effects and local labor market 
trends.
18  
The estimate is positive and implies a 3 percent wage increase from an increase in 
competition from 0 to 100 percent. Scaled at realized levels of competition (at most 30 
percent) this can be considered as a rather small effect.  Columns (2) and (3) continue to 
show the differential impact between entering and incumbent teachers, where entering 
teachers are defined as those who are not observed in the teacher register in any of the 
five preceding years. As previously discussed, the impact of competition is likely to be 
higher among teachers who are entering the profession than among incumbent ones, due 
to the higher mobility in this group. Consistent with this prediction I find that the effect 
is twice as large for new teachers; those who enter the most competitive areas receive 2 
percent higher wages than those who enter labor markets without any competition from 
                                                 
17 As mentioned above, this cannot be achieved in (1) since the decision to move between schools may be 
endogenous to the wage. To see this, if private schools attract teachers of high ability (as was suggested by the 
mobility patterns described in Section 5) then looking at public school teachers separately in (1) would produce 
estimates that are negatively biased by the outflow of teachers from the upper part of the ability distribution. 
18 To conserve space I do not report the estimates of the control variables but it should be noted that all of these enter 
with expected signs; wages are higher for males than for females, increases with age and level of education and are 
higher for certified teachers. Weighting the sample instead of using imputed wages does not alter any of these results. 
These results are available upon request. 
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 private schools.
19 Evaluated at the mean entry wage this effect corresponds to roughly 
400 SEK/ € 40/USD 50. 
Columns (4) and (5) present the result from the teacher fixed effects model. As 
argued above it is possible that the main effects capture both the direct impact of 
competition as well as compositional changes in the teachers’ labor pool. However, 
sorting of teachers does not seem to constitute any large issue of concern. Finally the 
last column shows that the estimated effect remains approximately the same when the 
sample is restricted to public school teachers only, suggesting that public schools 
respond to private school competition by raising the wages for incumbent teachers. 
Table 3 Baseline estimates of private school share on wages 
 All  Entering  Incumbent 
      Teacher  fixed  effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     All  All  Public 
       










       
Observations  408,731 47,169 361,562  361,562  341,689 
R
2  0.716 0.632 0.723 0.900 0.901 
LLM fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
LLM linear trends  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Teacher fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. Standard errors robust for 
serial correlation at the local labor market level are shown in parenthesis. In addition to the fixed effects indicated by 
the table all regressions control for year fixed effects and a dummy indicating whether the individual wage is imputed 
or not. The individual controls include gender, age, age
2, education dummies (6 bins) and the number of pupils in the 
given labor market and year.  
6.3.1  Differential effects by teachers’ field 
Although the estimates in Table 3 were positive and significant, the average effects 
suggested a rather small economic impact from competition on incumbent teachers’ 
wages. From the theoretical framework outlined in Section 2 we know that that these 
effects could mask heterogeneity across teachers with different characteristics. This 
section therefore continues to explore how these effects are distributed among teachers 
specialized in different fields.  
                                                 
19 To arrive at 2 percent I scale the estimate with the highest realized levels of competition, i.e. 0.068*0.3=0.0204.  
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  21 Table 4 reports the results from estimation of fully interacted versions of model (2) 
w.r.t. teachers’ field defined by their field of education. As we can see in Table 4, the 
effect of private competition is concentrated to teachers in math and science.
20 One 
potential explanation for this is that there is less available supply of these teachers than 
of teachers e.g. social science which increases the turnover costs in this group. Figure 
A3 illustrates the fraction of newly hired teachers in different fields from non-
employment. The measure is proposed by Manning (2003) to proxy for labor market 
tightness. As illustrated by the figure there seems to be a greater supply of teachers in 
social science which may partly explain why private competition has not translated into 
higher wages in this group.
21  
Table 4 Effect by teacher’s field  
 Incumbent  teachers 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 






      








Observations  361,562 22,135  45,401 113,846 
LLM fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
LLM linear trends  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Teacher fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
 Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. Standard errors robust for 
serial correlation at the local labor market level are shown in parenthesis. In addition to the fixed effects indicated by 
the table all regressions control for year fixed effects and a dummy indicating whether the individual wage is imputed 
or not. The individual controls include gender, age, age
2, education dummies (6 bins) and the number of pupils in the 
given labor market and year.  Because the model includes teacher fixed effects it estimates the effect for incumbent 
teachers only. Column (1) includes all teachers employed in Swedish high schools.  Besides those specialized in the 
fields mentioned in the table a large fraction is the non-certified teachers as well as teachers defined as having “other” 
as their field of specialization.   
 
 
                                                 
20 Since the model controls for local labor market fixed effects as well as local labor market trends time invariant 
differences between regions such as e.g. higher demands for math teachers in metropolitan areas with more 
employment in high technology industries will not bias the estimates. 
21 The figures are consistent with other descriptions of the teachers’ labor market suggesting that while there is an 
ample supply of teachers in social science the shortages are most pronounced among teachers in vocational subjects 
(SACO, 2009). Furthermore among female vocational teachers the largest shares are found in Health and Social Care 
(34.5 percent), (Business and Administration (13 percent) and Sports (11.1 percent). Males are most often found in 
Manufacturing (60 percent), Sports (12.4 percent) and Music (8.7 percent).   
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 6.4 Robustness  checks 
The empirical strategy is based on several assumptions. First, the expansion of private 
schools should be uncorrelated with regional trends in other underlying determinants of 
wages. Second, there should be no other changes that could influence wages and that 
coincide with the regional expansion of private schools. To check the validity of these 
assumptions I perform a number of robustness checks.  
As mentioned before, the scope for local wage setting was limited prior to 1996. If 
the fixed salary schemes were binding in the pre-reform period one concern is that the 
association between competition and wages captures a spurious relationship generated 
by differential trends in (unobserved) factors that would show up only after the wage 
scales were removed. Systematically different trends in economic growth, local 
amenities or school quality could for instance give rise to such omitted variable bias.
22 
While the identifying assumption cannot be tested directly, I can investigate whether the 
estimates are sensitive to the exclusion of covariates and use of alternative 
specifications. 
Panel A in Table 5 presents results where I omit covariates included in the baseline 
model. Because the average effects were concentrated among teachers in math and 
science Panel B in addition present estimates for this group only. Overall, these results 
are inconsistent with that the main effects are reflecting omitted variables rather than the 
true effect. Although the estimates are somewhat sensitive to the omission of regional 
linear trends, the estimates when excluding them from the model are not statistically 
different from the main effect.
23 Importantly, the estimates also seem robust to the 
inclusion of county×year fixed effects.
24 This is reassuring since it suggests that time-
varying factors at the county level are not driving the main effect.  
Finally in column (4) the estimate based on the sample without the Stockholm 
metropolitan area is reported. As the capital and largest metropolitan area of Sweden, 
                                                 
22 Böhlmark and Lindahl (2009) provide a deeper assessment of the determinants of private high school openings at 
the municipality level. While there seems to be no relationship between private school openings and pupil 
achievement levels, they do find that municipalities whose pupils most have increased their GPA in the 5 years prior 
to the reform have less growth in private schooling. This is a serious concern since it suggests that the degree of 
competition is negatively related to trends in school quality, which could motivate higher compensatory wages in 
these markets.  
23 I also tried including quadratic trends in the model yielding an estimate very close to the baseline (0.031 (0.017)). 
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  23 Stockholm constitutes an important labor market for teachers and it is therefore 
plausible that differences between Stockholm and other labor markets in Sweden could 
have large influence on the main effect. Moreover the city of Stockholm implemented 
an additional reform in 2000 enlarging the catchment area at the high school level.
25 
Excluding the Stockholm area from the sample does however not significantly change 
the baseline estimate. 
Table 5 Robustness checks 
                       Incumbent teachers 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Baseline effect  - trends  + County ×  Year  - Stockholm 
        
Panel A: All teachers  0.037** 0.104*** 0.060***  0.048** 
  (0.017) (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
Observations  361,562 361,562  361,562  298,995 
R
2  0.900 0.899  0.724  0.730 
        
Panel B: Math & Science   0.079** 0.109***  0.073*  0.059 
  (0.037) (0.035)  (0.042)  (0.043) 
Observations  24,235 24,235  24,235  22,584 
R
2  0.875 0.873  0.881  0.879 
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. Standard errors robust for 
serial correlation at the local labor market level are shown in parenthesis.  The baseline effect reported in column (2) 
repeats the estimate from model (2) described in the empirical section. All specifications in the table control for 
teacher fixed effects, year fixed effects, a dummy indicating whether the individual wage is imputed or not, gender, 
age, age
2, education dummies (6 bins) and the number of pupils in the given labor market and year.  
 
Appendix B reports results from additional robustness specifications. First, I test 
whether pre-school teachers are also experiencing higher wages when the share of 
private high schools increases. Because the analysis of the recruitment patterns in 
Section 5 indicated that the inflow of private high school did not impose any 
competitive pressure on pre-schools (only 0.8 percent of the total hires come from pre-
schools) I assume that pre-school teachers should be unaffected by the variation 
generated by the voucher reform, unless it is correlated with other factors that influence 
public wages such as trends in e.g. public spending, demands for private schooling, area 
amenities or labor quality. Reassuringly I find no relationship between private high 
                                                                                                                                               
24 There are 21 counties in Sweden, each containing 7 (sd 3.2) local labor markets on average. 
25 Before this reform, students in the city of Stockholm, just as in the rest of Sweden could choose high school but 
were assigned to their neighborhood school in case of space limitations. After the reform student admission is based 
solely on grades, which means that compared to the rest of Sweden, the scope for competition over students is larger. 
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 school expansion and wages among pre-school teachers (Table B1) which supports the 
conclusion that the main effect is not driven by local trends in omitted factors, at least to 
the extent that these are common to teachers at these levels.
26  
Finally, I look at the sensitivity of the results with respect to the definition of the 
labor market. Failure in defining the correct labor market may lead to downward biased 
estimates due to measurement error. Table B2 reports estimates using two alternative 
measures of competition, the municipality and the county. The estimates increase with 
the definition of the labor market although both specifications produce positive and 
significant estimates that are in the vicinity of the baseline results.
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6.5  Differential effects: gender and cognitive skills 
Having concluded that the results seem not to be driven by omitted variable bias, I turn 
to the association between school competition and the link between teacher wages and 
teacher ability. The results are reported in Table 6. Because cognitive skills are likely to 
be correlated with the selection of teachers across different fields, estimates are obtained 
using within field variation only. Moreover since the data on cognitive skills is available 
for male teachers only, I also report the estimates separately by gender.  
The effect is primarily concentrated among male teachers and there are also 
substantial differences by field. While the effect is concentrated among male teachers in 
math and science, female teachers in vocational subjects are the only ones benefiting 
from private competition. Again, these results are consistent with that competition 
matters more for teachers in areas of needs; the largest bulk of female vocational 
teachers are in the field “health and social” work, which is suffering from great 
shortages according to the Swedish National Board of Education.  
The last panel reports the differential effect of competition with respect to cognitive 
skills using model (2) described in the empirical section. For simplicity, I divide the 
male teachers into two groups, high and low ability teachers as separated by the median 
                                                 
26 Pre-school teachers constitute a valid placebo group for at least two reasons. First, although there has been an 
increase in private alternatives also at the pre-school level this is much less dramatic than at the high school level and 
has not led to any significant wage effects among existing pre-school teachers (Hanspers and Hensvik, 2010). In 
addition, because the funding of schools is based on the number of pupils enrolled any potential negative spill-over 
effects of wage increases among high-school teachers are likely to be small.   
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  25 percentile rank in the distribution of cohort specific military test scores. For teachers in 
math and science the estimates clearly suggest that the positive impact is concentrated 
among teachers with high cognitive ability. Among teachers specialized in other fields 
there is no clear pattern. 
Table 6 Estimates by field, gender and cognitive skills 
 Incumbent  teachers 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 






        
Panel A:  females  females  females  females 








Observations  174,041 7,771  28,165 50,312 
        
Panel B:  males  males  males  males 








Observations  187,521 14,364  17,236  63,534 
        
Panel C:  IQ  IQ  IQ  IQ 
















Observations  69,326 6,315  9,905 25,268 
LLM fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
LLM linear trends  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Teacher fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
 Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. Standard errors robust for 
serial correlation at the local labor market level are shown in parenthesis. In addition to the fixed effects indicated by 
the table all regressions control for year fixed effects and a dummy indicating whether the individual wage is imputed 
or not. The individual controls include gender, age, age2, education dummies (6 bins) and the number of pupils in the 
given labor market and year.  Column (1) includes all teachers employed in Swedish high schools.  Besides from 
those specialized in the fields mentioned in the table a large fraction is the non-certified teachers as well as teachers 
defined as having “other” as their field of specialization. The estimates in Panel C are based on a sample of male 
teachers belonging to the cohorts born between 1951 and 1980. An individual is recorded to be of high ability if 
having a military test score above the 50
th percentile within each cohort. 
 
Second I estimate the slope of the relationship between teachers’ log earnings and 
ability among teachers in the same year and local labor market and relate these 
estimates to the degree of competition in the assigned local labor market. To net out 
fixed differences between local labor markets two observations are obtained for each 
                                                                                                                                               
27 This is consistent with results in Jackson and Cowan (2009) who show that whereas teacher mobility is affected by 
competition at close distances teacher salary effects seem to occur at higher (the district) levels. 
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 local labor market (2000 and 2006). In practice this means that I relate the changes in 
local school competition to changes in the local returns to cognitive skills.  
The estimated returns to ability, reported in Table B3 in Appendix suggest that there 
is substantial variation in the returns to cognitive skills across locations.
28 Figure 4 in 
turn shows the plotted relationship between these returns and the degree of competition 
in the local labor market which suggests that there is a positive correlation between the 
two, both when looking at levels as well as changes between 2000 and 2006. Hence 
teachers in labor markets with the largest increase in private competition have also 
experienced the largest increases in the returns to cognitive skills. The association is 
confirmed when estimating this relationship using the within local labor market 
variation in private competition (see Table B4, Appendix).
29  
A potential concern is that the relationship reflects general regional trends in the 
returns to ability that are correlated with private high school expansion. To explore 
whether this concern is valid I estimate the returns to ability for workers in a non-
teaching profession in the same region. If there is no association between school 
competition and returns to ability for these workers it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the association found for teachers reflects a true relationship. Figure 4 plots the 
relationship for engineers, an occupation that should be a potential alternative for 
teachers educated in math and science. As expected, engineers have higher returns to 
ability compared to teachers. There is also a positive relationship between the level of 
returns and private school expansion suggesting that private schools tend to locate 
themselves in regions where the returns to ability are higher in general (figure 3c). In 
contrast however, there is no association between the changes in high school 
competition and returns to ability for these individuals. This is reassuring since it 
suggests that the increase in the returns to ability among teachers is at least not driven 
by trends that are common for these two groups of workers.
30  
                                                 
28 The restrictions of the sample (male teachers born between 1951 and 1981) require me to focus the analysis on 1/3 
of the largest local labor markets. Furthermore I choose the base year in the middle of the sample period (2000) since 
this allows me to include younger cohorts thereby increasing the number of teachers in the estimations. Apart from 
lowering precision, choosing an earlier base year does not alter the main conclusions. 
29 Weighting the observations according to their precision in the first stage produces very similar results. 
30 Figure B1 in Appendix shows the same plots for the weighted returns.  
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Figure 4 Association between the estimated returns to ability and school competition 
Notes: The estimated returns to cognitive test scores are obtained from traditional wage regressions that apart from 
the test scores include the age earnings profile and detailed field of education. The estimations are based on a sample 
of male teachers belonging to cohorts born between 1951 and 1980. 
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 7 Conclusions 
This paper has examined the impact of local private school competition in Sweden, 
introduced by a voucher reform, on teacher flows and wages. There are four main 
conclusions to be drawn about this relationship:  
(1) Private schools deviate substantially from public schools in their recruitment 
behavior; while private schools do not necessarily hire the most qualified teachers in 
terms of formal certification they do seem to attract younger teachers, teachers 
specialized in math and science and social science as well as teachers in the upper part 
of the skill distribution. In line with previous research these results suggest that the new 
private schools, with assumingly stronger incentives to attract students value other 
teacher characteristics than traditional public schools. 
(2) The increase in local school competition associated with the entry of private 
schools has led to a modest rise in average teacher wages. This effect cannot be 
explained by compositional changes in the teaching pool and it remains when restricting 
the sample to public school teachers. The relationship suggests that the limited 
competition in the educational market has contributed to the depressed wages in the 
teaching profession, and that the increased competition over teachers has translated into 
higher wages through a reduction in schools monopsonistic power.  
(3) While the average effects are modest there are substantial differences in the effect 
of private competition with respect to teacher characteristics. The effect is first of all 
twice as large for new teachers who are entering the profession. One potential 
explanation is that these teachers have higher wage elasticity than incumbent teachers 
which implies that they can exploit the increased number of employers when 
negotiating about the entry wage. Second, there are also differences with respect to 
teachers’ field of specialization; the effects are particularly pronounced for teachers in 
areas of needs, such as male teachers in math and science and female teachers in 
vocational subjects.  
(4) Finally, private competition is also associated with to a stronger link between 
teacher pay and teachers’ cognitive skills. This relationship does not appear for other 
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  29 groups of workers (engineers) which is consistent with that that school competition 
increases schools’ incentives to attract and retain the most able teachers.  
To summarize, in contrast to deregulation experiences in the private sector which 
document falling wages from an increase in competition, this paper shows that 
abolishing the local monopoly in the Swedish educational market led to higher teacher 
salaries, also among incumbent teachers in public schools. Given the high union 
coverage in Sweden these effects may be even more pronounced in other countries.  
Importantly, private competition has also generated a more differentiated wage 
setting according to teacher mobility, supply and cognitive skills. Given the literature 
highlighting the relationship between the pay structure and the secular declines in 
teacher quality observed in many countries, these results are promising since stronger 
incentives in the teachers’ market can have implications both for the choice of 
becoming a teacher as well as for the effort and output levels in a given teaching pool.  
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Figure A1 Variation in privatization across Swedish local labor markets (1991) 
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Figure A2 Kernel density distribution of LLM specific changes in the share of private 
high school teachers 
Notes: The figure is based on calculations of the local labor market specific changes in the share of private high 
school teachers within each labor market between 1991 and 2006. 
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Table A1 Descriptive statistics 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
PERIOD PRE  1991-1993 
Sample: All  Treated  Non-treated 
Share private   0.015 0.015 0.012 
Log(wage)  17430 17,442 17,338 
Sd  2628 2624 2659 
Age  47 47 47 
Female  0.47 0.48 0.40 
Certified  0.91 0.92 0.86 
Observations  76,642 67,415  9,227 
PERIOD POST  1994-2006 
Sample: All  Treated  Non-treated 
Share private   0.069 0.078 0.005 
Log(wage)  22,050 22,089 21,776 
Sd  3,835 3,836 3,821 
Age  47 47 47 
Female  0.49 0.49 0.43 
Certified  0.80 0.79 0.76 
Observations  390,075 342,488  47,587 
Notes: The table compares local labor markets with positive expansion (Treated) and no expansion (Non-Treated) of 
private school teachers during the entire study period (1991–2006). 
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Figure A3 Fraction of recruits from non-employment 
Notes: The fraction of recruits from non-employment is calculated by taking the number of newly recruited teachers 
who were observed as being non-employed in the previous year. 
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Table B1 Placebo-test: Pre-school teachers 
  Pre-school teachers 
Share private×  After  -0.007 
(0.016) 
   
Observations  1,410,021 
R
2  0.775 
LLM dummies  yes 
LLM specific trends  yes 
Teacher fixed effects  yes 
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. The estimate is obtained from 
estimation of model (2) described in Section 6.2 where the sample consists of all pre-school teachers in Sweden 
between 1991 and 2006. The dependent variable is the individual log monthly wage and standard errors are clustered 
at the local labor market level. Since there is no reliable information on hours worked for pre-school teachers, 
observations for those working in the private sector have been weighted according to the individual sampling 
probabilities. 
 
Table B2 Alternative labor market definitions 
 All  Entering  Incumbent 
      Teacher  fixed  effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     All  All  Public 
Panel A:     Baseline    










   
Panel B:  County 










   
Panel C:  Municipality 










       
Observations  408,731 47,169 361,562  361,562  341,689 
LLM fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
LLM linear trends  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Teacher fixed effects  no  no  no  yes  yes 
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. Standard errors robust for 
serial correlation at the local labor market/county/municipality level are shown in parenthesis. In addition to the fixed 
effects indicated by the table all regressions control for year fixed effects and a dummy indicating whether the 
individual wage is imputed or not. The individual controls include gender, age, age
2, education dummies (6 bins) and 
the number of pupils in the given labor market and year.  
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returns  Sd  Estimated 
returns  Sd  Δreturns  Δprivatization 
1  0.001 0.002 0.006 0.002  0.005  0.074 
2  0.019 0.009 0.004 0.004  -0.015  0.036 
3  0.002 0.017 0.009  0.01  0.007  0.055 
4  0.014 0.031 0.003 0.022  -0.011  -0.001 
5  0.011 0.009 -0.005 0.007  -0.016  0.011 
6  0.003 0.007 0.005 0.005  0.002  0.04 
7  0.012 0.008 0.004 0.005  -0.008  0.057 
9  0.009 0.017 0.015 0.029  0.006  0.008 
10  0.008 0.007 0.008 0.005  0  0.029 
14  0.005 0.018 -0.005 0.011  -0.009  0.044 
17  0.023 0.014 0.006 0.013  -0.018  0.003 
19  0.006  0.006 0 0.005  -0.006  0.057 
23  0.025 0.022 -0.003 0.011  -0.027  0.026 
24  -0.011 0.018 -0.003 0.014  0.008  0.014 
29  -0.002  0.011 0 0.009  0.002  0.055 
31  0.014 0.006 0.004 0.004  -0.01  0.006 
32  0.01 0.004 0.01 0.003  0  0.061 
33  0.012 0.005 0.007 0.003  -0.005  0.067 
35  0.015 0.01 0.014  0.006  -0.001  0.044 
36  0.01 0.009  0.011  0.011  0.001  0.017 
37  0.007 0.007 0.003  0.01  -0.004  0.028 
38  0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002  0.001  0.036 
40  -0.002 0.01 0.008 0.006  0.01  0.029 
43  0.004 0.006 0.005 0.009  0.001  0.051 
44  0.026 0.008 0.007 0.006  -0.018  0.033 
47  0.024 0.035 0.004 0.011  -0.02  0.023 
48  -0.003 0.009 0.005 0.005  0.008  0.039 
54  0.006 0.007 0.008 0.006  0.002  0.062 
62  0.001 0.005 0.003 0.004  0.002  0.037 
64  0.024 0.019 0.004 0.007  -0.02  0.035 
66  0.052 0.017 0.004 0.025  -0.048  0.007 
71  0.009 0.009 0.013 0.004  0.005  0.029 
76  -0.002 0.032 -0.003 0.009  -0.002  0.043 
77  0.008 0.009 0.013 0.005  0.005  0.073 
80  0.013 0.016 0.006 0.011  -0.007  0.003 
83  0.006 0.011 0.011 0.007  0.005  0.082 
85  -0.004 0.027 0.006 0.015  0.01  0.004 
86  0.008 0.008 -0.001 0.006  -0.01  0.031 
90  0.014 0.009 0.001 0.012  -0.013  0.055 
96  0.001 0.006 -0.006 0.004  -0.006  0.029 
98  0.001 0.007 0.002 0.005  0.001  0.02 
107  0.009 0.006 0.006 0.005  -0.003  0.027 
Notes: The table reports the local labor market specific estimated wage returns to cognitive skills for on 1/3 of the 
largest local labor markets. The estimates are obtained from traditional wage regressions that apart from the test 
scores include the age earnings profile and detailed field of education.  
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 (1)  (2) 
 Not  weighted  Weighted 
Private share  0.170** 0.148*** 
  (0.083) (0.050) 
Observations  85 85 
R-squared  0.618 0.684 
Year dummies  Yes Yes 
Local labor market dummies  Yes Yes 
Notes: The table shows the estimated relationship between the share of private high school teachers and the estimated 
returns to cognitive test scores in the assigned local labor market. Column (2) weights each observation with its 
inverted sampling variance of the estimated return to ability. 
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Figure B1 The association between the estimated returns to ability and school 
competition  
Notes: The estimated returns to cognitive test scores are obtained from traditional wage regressions that apart from 
the test scores include the age earnings profile and detailed field of education. Each observation is weighted 
according to its inverted sampling variance of the estimated returns in 2006. When including Stockholm in the plot 
there is a positive association between the returns to ability and school competition. For engineers however, this 
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